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DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PROTECTING
STUDENTS’ OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH BY SWITCHING THE
SAFETY ON TINKER’S TRIGGER
Joshua Rieger*
Abstract
Secondary-school students regularly engage in cyberspeech both
inside and outside the schoolhouse gate. Internet-era forms of
communication allow these students to produce off-campus cyberspeech
that can easily be accessed or brought onto campus by other students or
faculty. As early as the 1990s, public-school administrations began
punishing students for off-campus cyberspeech, accessed or brought onto
campus, that the administrations deemed threatening, intimidating,
harassing, or generally inappropriate for the school setting. Parents
continue to challenge public-school administrations’ punishments of their
children by filing civil suits in federal courts claiming these
administrations violated their children’s First Amendment right to free
speech. Whether parents’ challenges are successful usually turns upon
whether the students’ off-campus speech causes, or can be reasonably
forecasted to cause, a substantial disruption to school administration
under Tinker’s substantial-disruption test.
This Note addresses the conflict that arises when public-school
administrations punish students for off-campus cyberspeech, pitting a
student’s right to free speech against a school’s duty to provide students
a safe, nurturing environment. This Note discusses how federal circuit
and district courts apply different standards for triggering Tinker’s test
and explains why the holdings and dicta in Tinker and its progeny cases
challenge the application of Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech
cases. This Note offers a dual proposal that more accurately reflects the
Court’s school-speech jurisprudence and better protects students’ right to
free speech. First, federal circuit and district courts should decline to
apply Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. Tinker and its
progeny support greater protections for off-campus speech. At minimum,
lower federal courts should use a more stringent standard for triggering
Tinker’s test. Second, if federal courts continue to apply Tinker’s test,
then states should enact laws prohibiting school officials from punishing
students for off-campus cyberspeech, except when that speech constitutes
a true threat to the school community or is adjudicated as unlawful, as in
cases of cyberbullying, harassment, or defamation.
* J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, University
of Florida. For her endless patience, I dedicate this Note to my wife, Jacquelyn. For their
immeasurable support, I thank my family and friends, professors and teachers, and colleagues at
the Florida Law Review.

695

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5

696

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................697
I.

FEDERAL APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH ...........702
A. U.S. Supreme Court’s Silence on
Off-Campus Cyberspeech ...............................................703
1. Tinker v. Des Moines School District .....................703
2. Tinker’s Progeny Support
Location-Determinative Analysis ...........................705
a. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser ..........705
b. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier ..........707
c. Morse v. Frederick ............................................708
3. Effect of Denying Certiorari ...................................709
B. Circuit Courts’ Creativity in Triggering Tinker ............709
1. Circuit Courts’ Different Standards
for Triggering Tinker ...............................................710
a. Second and Eighth Circuits ...............................711
b. Fourth and Fifth Circuits ...................................712
c. Third Circuit ......................................................714
2. Third Circuit Debate on
Location-Determinative Analysis ...........................715
C. District Courts’ Adoption of Circuits’
Different Triggers ...........................................................719

II.

STATE APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH ................721
A. State Approach Subordinate to Federal Approach ........721
B. Federal Court Cases Addressing
Applicability of State Law ..............................................723

III.

PROTECTING THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT ..............................726
A. Alternatives to School Administrative Punishment ........726
1. True Threats.............................................................726
2. Cyberbullying and Online Harassment ...................727
3. Defamation ..............................................................729
B. School Administrative Punishment and
School-to-Prison Pipeline ..............................................729

IV.

DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE ....................................730
A. Unwiring Tinker for the Wireless World:
A New Federal Approach ...............................................731
B. Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger:
A New State Approach ....................................................735

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................736

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/5

2

Rieger: Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus

2018]

DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

697

INTRODUCTION
Since 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied several petitions for
writ of certiorari in First Amendment cases addressing whether publicschool administrations may punish public secondary-school students1 for
their cyberspeech2 created outside the schoolhouse gate during nonschool hours.3 The most recent of these cases, Bell v. Itawamba County
School Board,4 concerned the punishment of Taylor Bell, a high-school
student from Mississippi.5
During winter break of 2011, Bell produced a rap song and posted it
from his personal computer to his Facebook account.6 In his rap, Bell
1. This Note addresses cases concerning public-high-school and middle-school students.
Cases concerning private-school students, public-elementary-school students, or private- and
public-college students are outside the scope of this Note.
2. This Note defines cyberspeech as any form of speech produced over an internet or
wireless connection, such as e-mailing, posting, blogging, texting, messaging, and other similar
forms of communication (e.g., tweeting on Twitter or liking on Facebook).
3. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1166 (2016); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011);
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs.,
652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011); Wisniewski v.
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
4. 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated en banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’g 859
F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
5. Id. at 282.
6. Id. at 285. The Fifth Circuit en banc described Bell’s rap as “incredibly profane and
vulgar” and published Bell’s lyrics as follows:
Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba coaches / dirty ass niggas like
some fucking coacha roaches / started fucking with the white and know they
fucking with the blacks / that pussy ass nigga W[.] got me turned up the fucking
max / Fucking with the students and he just had a baby / ever since I met that
cracker I knew that he was crazy / always talking shit cause he know I’m from
daw-city / the reason he fucking around cause his wife ain’t got no tidies / This
niggha telling students that they sexy, betta watch your back / I’m a serve this
nigga, like I serve the junkies with some crack / Quit the damn basketball team /
the coach a pervert / can’t stand the truth so to you these lyrics going to hurt
What the hell was they thinking when they hired Mr. R[.] / dreadlock Bobby Hill
the second / He the same see / Talking about you could have went pro to the NFL
/ Now you just another pervert coach, fat as hell / Talking about you gangsta /
drive your mama’s PT Cruiser / Run up on T–Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with
my rueger Think you got some game / cuz you fucking with some juveniles / you
know this shit the truth so don’t you try to hide it now / Rubbing on the black
girls ears in the gym / white hoes, change your voice when you talk to them / I’m
a dope runner, spot a junkie a mile away / came to football practice high /
remember that day / I do / to me you a fool / 30 years old fucking with students
at the school Hahahah / You’s a lame / and it’s a dam shame / instead you was
lame / eat shit, the whole school got a ring mutherfucker Heard you textin number
25 / you want to get it on / white dude, guess you got a thing for them yellow
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alleged Michael Wildmon and Chris Rainey—athletic coaches at Bell’s
high school—sexually harassed female students.7 A few days after Bell’s
posting, news of Bell’s rap reached Wildmon during school hours.8
Because school computers blocked Facebook and Bell’s rap was only
accessible by his Facebook friends, the only way Wildmon could access
Bell’s rap was through a student’s cell phone with access to Bell’s
Facebook page.9 A student with access to Bell’s Facebook page provided
Wildmon a cell phone to view Bell’s rap, in violation of the school’s
regulation prohibiting students from bringing cell phones to school, and
Wildmon immediately informed the principal of the rap.10
The school administration sent Bell home that day (a Friday) and due
to heavy snowfall, Bell’s school remained closed until the following
Friday.11 During this period when school was closed, Bell created another
version of his rap and posted this newer version from his personal
computer to YouTube before classes resumed.12 When classes did
resume, the school administration removed Bell from class and
suspended him until a disciplinary committee hearing could be held.13
After the disciplinary committee hearing, both the disciplinary committee
and the school board concluded some of Bell’s lyrics “threatened,
intimidated, and/or harassed” the teachers, in violation of school-board
policy and Mississippi law.14 The disciplinary committee upheld Bell’s
seven-day suspension, required Bell to transfer to an alternative school
for the remainder of the nine-week grading period, and prohibited Bell
from attending school functions.15
bones / looking down girls shirts / drool running down your mouth / you fucking
with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your mouth / Boww OMG / Took
some girls in the locker room in PE / Cut off the lights / you motherfucking freak
/ Fucking with the youngins / because your pimpin game weak / How he get the
head coach / I don’t really fucking know / But I still got a lot of love for my nigga
Joe / And my nigga Makaveli / and my nigga codie / W[.] talk shit bitch don’t
even know me Middle fingers up if you hate that nigga / Middle fingers up if you
can’t stand that nigga / middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga / middle
fingers up / he get no mercy nigga.
Bell, 799 F.3d at 384 (alteration in original).
7. Bell, 774 F.3d at 283.
8. Id. at 285 (“Wildmon received a text message inquiring about the song from his wife,
who had been informed of Bell’s Facebook posting by a friend.”).
9. Id. at 285–86.
10. Id. at 286, 288.
11. Id. at 286.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 287–89.
15. Id.
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Bell’s mother brought a civil claim before a federal district court,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,16 alleging the school administrators
violated her son’s First Amendment right to free speech17 by punishing
him for his off-campus cyberspeech.18 The district court ruled in the
school’s favor on cross-motions for summary judgment, finding the
school officials acted reasonably under the Supreme Court’s Tinker v.
Des Moines School District19 substantial-disruption test (hereinafter,
Tinker’s test) and “did not err in punishing Bell for publishing [the rap]
to the public.”20
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Bell
nearly prevailed on his First Amendment claim.21 A Fifth Circuit panel
reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the school
board and declined to determine whether Tinker’s test is applicable to offcampus cyberspeech.22 Even if Tinker’s test were applicable to Bell’s
case, the Fifth Circuit panel concluded that “the evidence [did] not
support a finding . . . that Bell’s song either substantially disrupted the
school’s work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could
have forecasted such a disruption.”23 Further, the rap neither “gravely or
uniquely threaten[ed] violence” to the school community, nor constituted
a “true threat” to the teachers’ safety.24
The Fifth Circuit en banc reconsidered Bell’s case, vacated its panel’s
earlier opinion, and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the school board.25 Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, who
dissented in the Fifth Circuit’s panel opinion and characterized its holding
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
18. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
19. Id. at 840–41; see 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”). For a discussion of
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test, see infra Section I.A.
20. Bell, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
21. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 289, 304 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated en
banc, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’g 859 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
22. Id. at 304.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383.
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as “absurd,”26 authored the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion.27 Judge
Barksdale narrowly concluded Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus
cyberspeech “when a student intentionally directs at the school
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten,
harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when such speech originated, and
was disseminated, off-campus without the use of school resources.”28
Judge Barksdale also declined to adopt “any rigid standard [for when
Tinker’s test should and should not apply]” or “adopt or reject approaches
advocated by other circuits.”29
Because “a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast
as a matter of law” by the school administration due to Bell’s
“threatening, intimidating, and harassing language” towards teachers,30
the Fifth Circuit en banc reasoned Bell’s speech was not constitutionally
protected under Tinker’s test.31 Therefore, it was unnecessary to
determine whether Bell’s speech constituted a true threat.32 The Fifth
Circuit en banc held the school correctly punished Bell and did not violate
his First Amendment rights.33 Four judges dissented to the Fifth Circuit’s
en banc opinion,34 and Judge James L. Dennis, who authored the Fifth
Circuit’s vacated panel opinion, criticized “the majority opinion [for]
allow[ing] schools to police their students’ Internet expression anytime
and anywhere—an unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion on students’
rights.”35
Bell filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, but
the Court denied the petition.36 With the Supreme Court denying
certiorari in Bell’s case and all other off-campus cyberspeech cases,37 the
Court continues to deprive federal circuit and district courts of guidance
on whether Tinker’s test should apply to off-campus cyberspeech cases—
and if so, the appropriate standard for triggering Tinker’s test.38
26. Bell, 744 F.3d at 307 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
27. Bell, 799 F.3d at 383.
28. Id. at 396.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 398.
31. Id. at 400.
32. Id. True threats are not protected under the First Amendment. See Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding threats against President’s life were not true threats).
33. Bell, 799 F.3d at 398, 400.
34. Id. at 403, 433, 435.
35. Id. at 405 (Dennis, J., dissenting). For additional coverage of the Bell case, including
concurrences and dissents to the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion, see Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying
Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1571–80 (2017).
36. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
37. See cases cited supra note 3.
38. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1102–03 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The Supreme Court has yet to address the factual situation presented
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This Note addresses various conflicts that arise when public-school
administrations punish students for off-campus cyberspeech, pitting a
student’s right to free speech against a school’s duty to provide students
a safe, nurturing environment. Bell’s case offers a useful window into
many of these conflicts. First, should federal courts apply Tinker’s test to
off-campus cyberspeech cases? If so, what standard should federal courts
utilize to trigger Tinker’s test? Second, if a federal court does not apply
Tinker’s test, or Tinker’s test is not satisfied, what types of cyberspeech
still lack First Amendment protection? Third, what are the competing
arguments for allowing school administrations to punish students for offcampus cyberspeech that satisfies Tinker’s test, or prohibiting these
administrations from doing so? Fourth, are there alternatives to
punishment by school administrations? Lastly, there is a question that has
not received great attention from legal scholarship: How can state law
affect off-campus cyberspeech cases? This Note addresses these
questions and related concerns as follows:
Part I examines the federal case law currently controlling off-campus
cyberspeech cases. Part I analyzes how Tinker and its progeny cases
support greater First Amendment protections for students’ off-campus
speech than on-campus speech and further details how federal circuit and
district courts have established different standards for triggering Tinker’s
test.
Part II examines the relatively sparse state case law affecting offcampus cyberspeech cases, as well as federal case law considering how
state law (e.g., constitutions, statutes, and regulations) could impact the
federal cases.
Part III addresses whether courts’ and school officials’ concern for
protecting the school environment serves as an adequate justification for
allowing school administrations to punish students for their off-campus
cyberspeech. Part III also questions to what extent other governmental or
private causes of action, such as cyberbullying, harassment, and
defamation, may be better suited to meet public policy goals and First
Amendment principles than school administrative punishment.
Part IV presents a dual proposal for new federal and state approaches
to address students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. First, this Note
proposes lower federal courts engage in location-determinative analysis,
recognizing a distinction between on-campus and off-campus
cyberspeech. The lower federal courts can reject the application of
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases. More realistically, if lower
federal courts continue applying Tinker’s test, the lower federal courts
can adopt a more stringent standard for triggering Tinker’s test. Both
by the case at hand—that is, whether a school can regulate student speech or expression that
occurs outside the school gates, and is not connected to a school-sponsored event, but that
subsequently makes its way onto campus, either by the speaker or by other means.”).
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options are supported by the holdings and dicta in Tinker and its progeny
supporting the proposition that students’ off-campus speech is entitled to
greater free-speech protection than students’ on-campus speech.
However, lower federal courts will probably continue along the current
path.
Second, this Note proposes that states enact laws designed to expand
students’ right to free speech in the off-campus cyberspeech context
beyond what is recognized by the lower federal courts’ interpretations of
the Court’s school-speech jurisprudence. With such a law in place, a
parent could more easily file a civil suit in state court rather than the less
favorable federal court system.
I. FEDERAL APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH
In the 1969 landmark opinion of Tinker v. Des Moines School District,
Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas declared, “It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”39 Justice Fortas’s primary
concern was students not losing their constitutional rights to free speech
when entering through the schoolhouse gate, not exiting from it.40 In three
student-speech cases that followed, the Court carved exceptions to this
declaration, noting when student speech loses its protections inside the
schoolhouse gate.41 Although neither Tinker nor its progeny established
what test or standard should be applied to off-campus student-speech
cases, Tinker and its progeny offered dicta that the student speech at issue,
though not protected on-campus, would have been protected off-campus
under the First Amendment.42
In off-campus cyberspeech cases arising since the late 1990s, federal
circuit and district courts have concluded Tinker and its progeny permit
school administrations to punish students for off-campus cyberspeech
that satisfies Tinker’s test.43 However, the lower federal courts have
crafted different standards for triggering Tinker’s test.
Section I.A examines the Supreme Court’s four landmark cases
concerning student speech and the Court’s silence as to whether Tinker’s
test is applicable to off-campus student-speech cases. Section I.B
discusses the circuit courts’ creativity in applying Tinker’s test to offcampus cyberspeech cases, despite the Court’s silence. Section I.C
39. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
40. Id.
41. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
42. See infra Subsection I.A.2.
43. See Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–
80 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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discusses how district courts that lack a binding circuit decision are then
persuaded to adopt one or another of the circuits’ different standards for
triggering Tinker’s test.
A. U.S. Supreme Court’s Silence on Off-Campus Cyberspeech
From 1969 to 2007, the Supreme Court decided four landmark cases
concerning on-campus student speech.44 But the Court remains
deafeningly silent on cases addressing students’ off-campus
cyberspeech,45 and off-campus student speech in general. The practical
effect is federal circuit and district courts will likely continue to broadly
interpret and apply Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines School District
In December 1969, two high-school students and one middle-school
student from Des Moines, Iowa, crafted a plan to wear black armbands to
school in protest of the Vietnam War.46 The students’ principals learned
of the plan and adopted a policy restricting students from wearing
armbands.47 When the students refused to remove their armbands at
school, the principals suspended the students until they decided to return
to school without the armbands.48 The students’ fathers filed a complaint
with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa asking for
an injunction prohibiting the school from punishing the students.49 The
district court ruled in the school’s favor, and a divided U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit en banc affirmed the district court’s
decision without an opinion.50
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and
remanded, opining “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”51 To protect students’ First Amendment right to free
speech, the Court adopted a substantial-disruption test, that is, Tinker’s
test. To permissibly regulate student’s “pure speech,”52 a school must
provide evidence “showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See infra Subsections I.A.1–I.A.2.
See cases cited supra note 3.
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 506, 514.
Id. at 508.
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‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”53 The Court
concluded the schools presented no evidence that the armbands caused,
or could reasonably be foreseen to cause, a substantial disruption.54
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black dissented to this decision,
proclaiming that “[s]chool discipline . . . is an integral and important part
of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens. . . . This
case . . . subjects all the public schools in the country to the whims and
caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest,
students.”55
Where the Court unwittingly set the stage for controversy concerning
off-campus student-speech cases was its discussion of where, when, and
how student speech loses its First Amendment immunization.56 The
Court stated its ruling would not be “confined to the supervised and
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom” or “embrace
merely the classroom hours.”57 The Court specifically qualified that this
statement applies to students’ right to free speech in places like cafeterias,
playing fields, or the general school campus.58 Although the Court
appeared to restrict its holding to on-campus student speech, the Court
later articulated and arguably expanded upon Tinker’s test, opening the
door for lower federal courts looking to apply Tinker’s test to off-campus
student-speech:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.59
In Tinker’s progeny cases, the Court considers whether Tinker’s test
is applicable to on-campus student speech, and each case presents an
example of when the Court finds a school has an important interest in
light of its “special characteristics”60 outweighing a student’s First
Amendment right to free speech.61 Notably, in each of Tinker’s progeny
cases, the Court explicitly stated in dicta that the unprotected on-campus
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
Id. at 509–10.
Id. at 524–25 (Black, J., concurring).
See id. at 512–13 (majority opinion).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 512–13.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 506.
See infra Subsection I.A.2.
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student speech at issue would have been protected under the First
Amendment had the speech been made off campus.62
2. Tinker’s Progeny Support Location-Determinative Analysis
The Supreme Court considered three student-speech cases after its
decision in Tinker, each carving an exception to students’ right to free
speech on campus: Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser,63
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,64 and Morse v. Frederick.65 The
Fraser Court affirmed the school punishment of a student for vulgar
language during a speech at a school assembly.66 The Hazelwood Court
affirmed the school censorship of two stories in a school-sponsored
newspaper concerning a student’s pregnancy and the divorce of a
student’s parents.67 The Morse Court affirmed the school’s punishment
of a student who unfurled a banner at a school-sponsored event that read,
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”68 While the Court ruled the student’s speech
was not protected under the First Amendment in each of these cases, the
Court opined that had the same speech in these cases been made off
campus, it would have been protected under the First Amendment.69
These conclusions by the Court support the contention that the location
of student speech (for example, on-campus versus off-campus) is a
relevant factor when determining the degree to which student-speech is
protected under the First Amendment (the “location-determinative
analysis”). Therefore, there is a strong argument to be made that locationdeterminative analysis should be applied when determining whether
Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus student-speech cases, including
those involving cyberspeech.
a. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
Fraser arose in April 1983 when—at a school assembly of roughly
600 students—one student gave a speech nominating another student for
an elected position.70 The Fraser Court described the student’s speech as
an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”71 and upheld the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infra Subsection I.A.2.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–74.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
See infra Subsections I.A.2.a, A.2.b, A.2.c.
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
Id. at 677–78. The student’s speech read:
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school administration’s three-day suspension of the student for a
violation of the school’s regulation prohibiting obscene language.72 To
rationalize why the student’s nomination speech was not afforded the
protections granted by Tinker, the Fraser Court looked to the school’s
interest in educating students to become good citizens73 and society’s
interest in protecting minors from inappropriate language.74 The Court
concluded “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. . . .
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”75 The
majority explicitly qualified the school board’s authority to regulate
student speech “in the classroom or in the school assembly,” denoting a
limit to where the school board’s authority exists.76 Nevertheless, because
the student produced a provocative speech at a school assembly, the Court
held that the school did not violate the student’s First Amendment right
to free speech.77
In a concurring opinion, Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. specifically addressed the breadth of Fraser’s holding.78 Justice
Brennan reasoned, “If [the student] had given the same speech outside of
the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because
government officials considered his language to be inappropriate; the
Court’s opinion does not suggest otherwise.”79 Although Justice
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his
character is firm—but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president—he’ll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.
Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
72. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678, 685. The school rule provided, “Conduct which materially and
substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene,
profane language or gestures.” Id. at 678. This rule’s language clearly tracks the language of
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test.
73. Id. at 683.
74. Id. at 684–85.
75. Id. at 683.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 685.
78. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. Id. (citations omitted).
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Brennan’s logic is merely persuasive, it provides support for the
contention that location-determinative analysis is warranted in
determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus studentspeech cases.
b. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Hazelwood arose in May 1983 when a high-school journalism class
submitted to the principal page proofs for the school’s newspaper.80 The
principal censored two stories—one related to a student’s pregnancy and
another related to the divorce of a student’s parents.81 The newspaper
went to print without those two stories, and the parents of three student
journalists filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri claiming the school violated the students’
First Amendment right to free speech.82 The Supreme Court ultimately
held this on-campus student-speech was not protected under the First
Amendment.83
The Hazelwood Court began its analysis looking to Tinker and Fraser,
affirming the special characteristics of the school environment and that
students’ rights are not co-extensive with those of adults.84 The
Hazelwood Court distinguished the question in Tinker—“whether the
First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student
speech”—from the instant question—“whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”85
Finding the key difference to be that the speech in Tinker did not bear the
“imprimatur of the school,” whereas a school newspaper created through
the school’s journalism curriculum does bear a school’s imprimatur,86 the
Hazelwood Court held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”87
Importantly, in dicta, the Hazelwood Court interpreted Fraser to hold
that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with
its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 263–64.
Id. at 272–73.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
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censor similar speech outside the school.”88 Again, the Court clearly
provides support for the contention that location-determinative analysis
is warranted in determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to offcampus student-speech cases.
c. Morse v. Frederick
Morse arose in January 2002 when an Alaskan high school held an
event to allow students to watch the Olympic Torch Relay. 89 Students
were permitted to stand along the sidewalk in front of the high school or
the sidewalk across from the high school as the relay passed by.90 A group
of high-school students standing on the sidewalk across from the high
school “unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.’”91 When the principal demanded the students take down the
banner, all students complied but one.92 The incompliant student received
a ten-day suspension because the principal believed the banner violated
the school policy prohibiting the advocation of illegal-drug use.93 The
Supreme Court held the student did not have a First Amendment right to
unfurl his banner.94
Similar to the Fraser and Hazelwood Courts, the Morse Court
acknowledged the school environment’s special characteristics and the
fact that students’ rights are not co-extensive with those of adults.95 The
Morse Court reasoned “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school
environment,’ and the governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably
regard as promoting illegal drug use.”96 Thus, the Morse Court held the
school could permissibly “restrict student speech at a school event, when
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”97
Reasoning that student speech at school events falls within the
purview of on-campus student speech, the Morse Court avoided the
uncomfortable task of addressing what standards or tests govern offcampus student speech. Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea argued that the
88. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))
(emphasis added).
89. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 398.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 400.
95. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
96. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
97. Id. at 403.
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Morse Court missed a glaring opportunity to provide much-needed
guidance in off-campus student-speech cases.98 Nevertheless, the Morse
Court—like the Hazelwood Court—acknowledged in dicta how Fraser’s
holding supports a distinction between on- and off-campus student
speech,99 providing support for the contention that location-determinative
analysis is warranted in determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable
to off-campus student-speech cases.
3. Effect of Denying Certiorari
Following the Morse decision, the Supreme Court received several
petitions for writ of certiorari in off-campus cyberspeech cases.100 By
denying these petitions, the Court leaves the lower federal courts without
guidance on what test or standard should be applied to off-campus
cyberspeech cases. Perhaps the Court’s silence shows an implicit
approval of how the lower federal courts have handled these cases.
Perhaps the Court’s silence underscores a hesitancy to fashion a test or
standard that may cause more issues than it solves as students’ use of
cyberspeech continues to evolve. One can only guess why the Court
denied each petition for writ of certiorari in off-campus cyberspeech
cases since 2008. The only outcome of the Court’s silence that appears
certain is lower federal courts will continue to support the application of
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases.
B. Circuit Courts’ Creativity in Triggering Tinker
While circuit courts uniformly hold Tinker’s test is applicable to offcampus cyberspeech cases, the circuit courts split on the standard for
when Tinker’s test should be triggered.101 Some circuit courts adopt a
broad reasonable-foreseeability standard.102 Other circuit courts adopt
seemingly narrower standards, such as the Fifth Circuit’s intent-based
standard outlined in Bell.103 In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit assumed, without deciding, Tinker’s test applied
because the school administration could not prove the student’s offcampus cyberspeech caused a substantial disruption at school.104
98. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027,
1028 (2008) (“[In Morse], the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to determine whether public
schools have authority to restrict student speech that occurs off school grounds.”).
99. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected.”).
100. See cases cited supra note 3.
101. See infra Subsection I.B.1.
102. See infra Subsection I.B.1.a.
103. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b.
104. See infra Subsection I.B.1.c.
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Circuit courts are clearly conflicted and bereft of guidance on what
standard is appropriate to trigger Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech
cases, and arguably, whether Tinker’s test should be applied in the first
place. Two opinions—one concurrence and one dissent—from the Third
Circuit case, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,105
provide a useful window into the arguments underpinning this issue.106
1. Circuit Courts’ Different Standards for Triggering Tinker
Circuit courts have established different standards for triggering
Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech cases. At one end of the
spectrum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits
apply a broad reasonable-foreseeability standard.107 At the other end, the
Third Circuit assumed, without deciding, Tinker’s test is applicable to
off-campus cyberspeech cases.108 Between these poles, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fashioned a nexus-based standard, similar
to the reasonable-foreseeability standard.109 The Fifth Circuit imposed an
intent-based standard that is facially narrow but broad in its
application.110 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
tailored a true-threat-based standard for a case involving particularly
threatening cyberspeech, but this standard and true threats will be
discussed more fully in Subsection III.A.1.111 The circuit courts’ lack of
coherence on what standard should trigger the application of Tinker’s test
stems from the circuits stretching the holdings and dicta of Tinker and its
progeny cases to capture students’ off-campus cyberspeech.112 This lack
of coherence and stretching is particularly troubling in off-campus

105. 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
106. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
107. See infra Subsection I.B.1.a.
108. See infra Subsection I.B.1.c.
109. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b.
110. See infra Subsection I.B.1.b.
111. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen faced
with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to
off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”).
112. See id. (“One of the difficulties with the student speech cases is an effort to divine and
impose a global standard for a myriad of circumstances involving off-campus speech. . . . [W]e
are reluctant to try and craft a one-size fits all approach. We do not need to consider at this time
whether Tinker applies to all off-campus speech . . . .”); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d
379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Further, in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech in this
instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter, we
decline: to adopt any rigid standard in this instance; or to adopt or reject approaches advocated by
other circuits.”).
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cyberspeech cases because application of Tinker’s test has been outcomedeterminative.113
a. Second and Eighth Circuits
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education114 and Doninger v. Niehoff,115
the Second Circuit concluded Tinker’s test applies to off-campus
cyberspeech that “poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that [it] would
come to the attention of school authorities.”116 The Eighth Circuit, in
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District # 60117 and S.J.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. Lee’s Summit School District,118 adopted the Second Circuit’s
reasonable-foreseeability standard.119 In adopting a reasonableforeseeability standard, the Second and Eighth Circuits are the circuits
most likely to permit application of Tinker’s test in off-campus
cyberspeech cases.
Of all forms of off-campus student speech, off-campus cyberspeech is
most at risk of coming to the attention of a school official. For example,
the cyberspeech at issue in Wisniewski, Doninger, D.J.M., and S.J.W.
were online instant messages,120 blog posts,121 and content on a studentcreated website.122 Anyone with access to these and other forms of
student cyberspeech can reproduce it in a matter of seconds at any
location with Wi-Fi or cellular service. Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable
that nearly all off-campus cyberspeech could make its way inside the
schoolhouse gate and before a school official’s desk.123

113. See, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir.
2012) (“The [students’] success on the merits will depend on what standard the District Court
applies. The School District argues [Tinker] should control. The [students] argue otherwise.”).
114. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
115. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
116. See id. at 347; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
117. 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
118. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 778 (“Just like the online speech in . . . Doninger, the NorthPress posts ‘could
reasonably be expected to reach the school . . . .’”); Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 766 (“Here it was
reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats about shooting specific students in school would be
brought to the attention of school authorities . . . .”).
120. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 757; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35.
121. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 340–41.
122. Lee’s Summit, 696 F.3d at 773.
123. In his concurrence to Blue Mountain, Judge Smith reasoned, “A bare foreseeability
standard could be stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that
happened to discuss school-related matters.” J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring).
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b. Fourth and Fifth Circuits
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopted what appear facially to be more
stringent standards for triggering Tinker’s test. In Kowalski v. Berkeley
County Schools,124 the Fourth Circuit put forth a nexus-based standard
considering whether there is a “sufficiently strong” nexus between the
student’s cyberspeech and the school’s “pedagogical interests” to “justify
the action taken by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees
of the student body’s well-being.”125 One scholar argues that the Fourth
Circuit actually adopted a reasonable-foreseeability standard, like the
Second and Eighth Circuits.126 Whether the Fourth Circuit adopted a
nexus-based or reasonable-foreseeability standard is ultimately a
distinction without a difference, as is discussed below.
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Fifth Circuit fashioned
an intent-based standard considering whether “a student intentionally
directs at the school community speech reasonably understood by school
officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when such
speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus without the use of
school resources.”127 Although these standards appear narrower than the
reasonable-foreseeability standard for triggering Tinker’s test, the
nebulous wording of these two standards allow judges leeway in
determining what “sufficient nexus” and “intentionally directs at the
school community” mean.
In Kowalski, the Fourth Circuit concluded a student’s webpage
entitled “Students Against Sluts Herpes” satisfied the nexus-based
standard because:
[The student] knew that the electronic response would
be . . . published beyond her home and could reasonably be
expected to reach the school or impact the school
environment. [The student] also knew that the dialogue
would and did take place among . . . students whom she
invited to join the [webpage] and that the fallout from her
conduct and the speech within the group would be felt in the
school itself.128
Here, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for satisfying its nexus-based
standard in Kowalski makes the application of the nexus-based standard

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 573.
Shaver, supra note 35, at 1595 n.435.
799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015).
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
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virtually identical to the Second and Eighth Circuits’ reasonableforeseeability standard.129
The Fifth Circuit’s intent-based standard also lacks teeth.130 The Fifth
Circuit concluded in Bell that the intent-based standard was satisfied
because “[the student] intended his rap recording to reach the school
community. . . . [The student] produced and disseminated the rap
recording knowing students, and hoping administrators, would listen to
it.”131 Here, the Fifth Circuit blurred an important distinction between a
student intending cyberspeech to reach the school community (that is, an
intent for the cyberspeech to be accessed on-campus) versus a student
intending cyberspeech to reach a target audience including members of
the school community.132 A student knowing or hoping fellow students
and administrators would access her off-campus cyberspeech does not
necessarily equate to the student intending the cyberspeech to reach the
school community, especially when the school has policies designed to
limit off-campus speech from being accessed or brought on-campus.133
Whether a student evinces an intent for off-campus cyberspeech to reach
the school community should be a fact-intensive determination requiring
more than a student’s knowledge or hope that members in the school
community access the off-campus cyberspeech.134
129. See supra Subsection I.B.1.a.
130. See Shaver, supra note 35, at 1596–97 (“The intentional direction language used by the
Fifth Circuit in Bell might, at first glance, appear to set a higher threshold because it would require
that the student had directed speech into the school environment. However, it suffers from
essentially the same defects as the reasonable foreseeability test. Again, the threshold for
imposition of authority is quite low if a student’s intentional direction is determined by the extent
to which the student spoke on a matter of interest to the school community and intended that other
students would consider the speech. As with the reasonable foreseeability test, it seems that
students would essentially have no protection if they sought to speak about a matter in any way
related to school and if they wanted their speech to reach others. In addition, the intentional
direction test has the added difficulty of asking school officials to determine the subjective intent
of a student before imposing discipline.” (footnotes omitted)).
131. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (including policies blocking specific website
access on school computers and banning students’ use of or access to cell phones on-campus).
134. The importance of this distinction is supported by the Second and Eighth Circuits’
decisions addressing students’ distribution of underground periodicals, which is another common
off-campus student-speech situation. Compare Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050–52
(2d Cir. 1979) (holding the school violated student’s First Amendment right to free speech by
punishing the student for distributing an underground periodical off-campus), with Bystrom v.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 822 F.2d 747, 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding constitutional a school policy
prohibiting students from distributing their off-campus publications on campus). Consider two
students who publish underground periodicals. The first student distributes the periodical to
students and faculty just before entering the school premises as the school day begins, whereas
the second student distributes the periodical to students and faculty just as they exit the school
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c. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit, in Layshock v. Hermitage School District135 and
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, skirted the issue of
establishing a standard for triggering Tinker’s test and just assumed,
without deciding, that Tinker’s test is applicable to off-campus
cyberspeech cases.136 In both cases the Third Circuit concluded the
school districts could not establish a substantial disruption or reasonably
forecast a substantial disruption, thus failing Tinker’s test.137 It is not clear
what approach the Third Circuit will take when it reviews a district court
decision with facts supporting a conclusion that a school district
experienced a substantial disruption or could reasonably forecast a
substantial disruption.138 Although the Third Circuit currently lacks a
standard triggering Tinker’s substantial-disruption test in off-campus
cyberspeech cases, this circuit appears most amenable to taking a narrow
view of Tinker’s holding.139
In a buried footnote of the Blue Mountain decision, the Third Circuit
noted there was “some appeal” to the student’s argument “that the First
Amendment ‘limits school official[s’] ability to sanction student speech
to the schoolhouse itself.’”140 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded the
school administration violated the student’s right to free speech, so the
premises after the school day ends. Both students know and hope students and faculty will access
their periodicals. It is clear the first student evinces a stronger intent for his off-campus speech to
reach the school community, and thus more likely to trigger Tinker’s test, because the students
and faculty are more likely to bring the periodical with them inside the schoolhouse gate. But it
is less clear whether the second student intended for the periodical to reach the school community.
135. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
136. Id. at 219 (“We need not now define the precise parameters of when the arm of authority
can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because . . . the district court found that [the student’s]
conduct did not disrupt the school, and the District does not appeal that finding.”); J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court
established a basic framework for assessing student free speech claims in Tinker, and we will
assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to [the student’s] speech in this case.”).
137. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219; Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 930–31.
138. See, e.g., A.N. v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 400–01 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (denying suspended student’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction seeking
immediate reinstatement because student was unlikely to succeed on the merits that school
violated student’s right to free speech in punishing him for an Instagram post mashing up a Sandy
Hook video and song about school shooting, which could reasonably lead the school district to
forecast a substantial disruption).
139. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 933 (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever
allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored or at a
school-sponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at school. . . . An opposite
holding would significantly broaden school districts’ authority over student speech and would
vest school officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”).
140. Id. at 926 n.3.
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majority declined to address the merits of location-determinative
analysis.141 Instead, Third Circuit judges took to concurrences and
dissents to debate the merits of location-determinative analysis.142
2. Third Circuit Debate on Location-Determinative Analysis
In Blue Mountain, Judge Brooks Smith’s concurrence (joined by four
Third Circuit judges) and Judge Michael Fisher’s dissent (joined by five
Third Circuit judges) specifically debated the role location should play in
determining whether Tinker’s test is applicable to students’ off-campus
cyberspeech cases. Judge Smith’s concurrence argues against applying
Tinker’s test to off-campus student speech, except off-campus speech that
is “intentionally directed towards a school [which] is properly considered
on-campus speech.”143 Judge Fisher’s dissent argues Tinker’s test should
govern “off-campus speech which causes substantial on-campus
disruption under Tinker.”144 Both opinions differ on their interpretation
of Tinker’s language, particularly the phrase “in class or out of it.”145 Both
opinions also offer slippery-slope arguments, where Judge Smith thrusts
a concern of school officials’ overreach and Judge Fisher parries with a
concern about “leav[ing] schools defenseless to protect teachers and
school officials against [students’] attacks and powerless to discipline
students for the consequences of their actions.”146
Judges Smith and Fisher strike at the heart of issue debating whether
the Tinker Court meant the phrase “in class or out of it” to limit
application of Tinker’s test solely to on-campus speech or to off-campus
speech as well. Judge Smith took the narrow view finding the Tinker
Court meant to limit its test to on-campus speech, for “[h]ad the Court
intended to vest schools with the unprecedented authority to regulate
students’ off-campus speech, surely it would have done so
unambiguously.”147 Judge Smith supported his interpretation of the
phrase “in class or out of it” by reading it in context with its immediately
preceding sentences,148 where the Tinker Court stated:
The principle of these cases is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the
classroom. The principal use to which the schools are
dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 926 n.3, 931.
Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring); id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id. at 943 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Compare id. at 937–38 n.1 (Smith, J., concurring), with id. at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring); id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 937–38 n.1 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id.
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those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of the
educational process. A student’s rights, therefore, do not
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours, he may express his opinions . . . if he
does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school” and without colliding with the
rights of others.149
To Judge Smith, the plain meaning of the Tinker Court’s language is
unambiguous and limits Tinker’s substantial-disruption test to on-campus
student speech. Judge Fisher disagrees.
Judge Fisher found the phrase “in class or out of it” ambiguous, or as
Judge Fisher put it, “unclear.”150 Judge Fisher was uncertain whether the
phrase was meant to distinguish students’ on-campus speech from offcampus speech—in which case Tinker’s test would apply to off-campus
student speech—or to distinguish students’ on-campus speech in the
classroom from other places on the school grounds—in which case
Tinker’s test would not apply to off-campus student speech.151 But Judge
Fisher was certain of two things. First, the Court did not address the issue
of whether Tinker’s test should apply to off-campus student speech;
second, Tinker’s test should determine the outcome of that case.152
Permeating Judges Smith and Fisher’s debate are public policy
rationales. Judge Smith expressed two concerns. How long should the
long arm of the school’s regulatory powers over student speech be?153
And would applying Tinker’s test to off-campus speech give rise to a
scenario where adults could be regulated for their off-campus speech
causing substantial disruptions in a school?154 The first concern is clearly
more legitimate than the second, which Judge Smith noted is “absurd.”155
Parents bring civil suits in federal courts precisely because they do not
149. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
150. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 943.
153. Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring) (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create
a precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”).
154. Id. at 940.
155. Id.
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believe the school should have the regulatory power to punish their
children for speech that occurred when the children were in the comfort
of their homes or elsewhere outside the schoolhouse gate. Those parents
do not share Judge Smith’s concern that they will be punished by a school
for their off-campus speech, not because Tinker’s test could not be
applied equally between students and their parents, but because it is
absurd to “extend[] Tinker beyond the public-school setting to which it is
so firmly moored.”156
Judge Fisher’s public policy concern centered upon the distinction
between the political speech protected in Tinker and the vulgar speech
protected in Blue Mountain. Judge Fisher was most concerned about the
negative effects the vulgar speech in Blue Mountain could have on
educators and their families.157 Whereas Tinker involved the political
speech of wearing of an armband to protest the Vietnam War, which
Judge Fisher agreed deserved protection under the First Amendment,158
Blue Mountain involved the creation of a fake MySpace profile of an
educator accusing that educator of sexual misconduct.159 Judge Fisher did
not see the profile as a nonsensical, juvenile joke, as the majority did.160
Judge Fisher saw the profile, and ones similar to it, as capable of causing
educators psychological harm to the point that they cannot interact
sufficiently with students or quit their jobs altogether.161
Under the dissent’s reasoning, it should be left to the school to
determine “how it should handle violations of its policy that are of as
serious and grave a matter as false accusations of sexual misconduct.”162
Judge Fisher believes “[s]chool administrators, not judges, are best
positioned to assess the potential for harm in cases like this one, and we
should be loath to substitute our judgments for theirs.”163 But a potential
gap in Judge Fisher’s public policy argument is that it presupposes
Tinker’s test is applicable equally to on-campus and off-campus
cyberspeech cases.
Shifting from the underlying public policy to the practical application
of legal tests and standards for off-campus cyberspeech cases, Judge
Smith notes that public policy concerns are “only half the battle.”164 The
other half of the battle involves how courts should determine whether
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 946 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 943–44.
Id. at 948–49.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
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cyberspeech is off-campus or on-campus speech. Judge Smith admits this
is a difficult task due to the “‘everywhere at once’ nature of the
internet.”165 Here, Judge Fisher agrees with Judge Smith.166 Daring not
to define an exact test or standard to be used to determine whether
cyberspeech is on-campus or off-campus, Judge Smith explains why he
would favor an intent-based standard over a reasonable-foreseeability
standard.167 Judge Smith would allow off-campus cyberspeech
“intentionally directed towards a school [to be] properly considered oncampus speech.”168 Viewed alone, this intent-based argument could
single-handedly undermine Judge Smith’s argument that students’ offcampus cyberspeech discussing school matters should not be subject to
Tinker’s test. Opponents would simply argue students’ off-campus
cyberspeech concerning school matters is intentionally directed towards
the school because the speech will inevitably reach students, teachers,
and administrators.
Judge Smith is careful to qualify his argument for an intent-based
standard with a countervailing argument against a reasonableforeseeability standard.169 Judge Smith warns that off-campus student
speech does not “mutate into on-campus speech simply because it
foreseeably makes its way onto campus.”170 He further criticizes “[a] bare
foreseeability standard [because it] could be stretched too far, and would
risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened to discuss
school-related matters.”171 Unsurprisingly, Judge Fisher favors adopting
the Second Circuit’s reasonable-foreseeability standard172 in applying
Tinker’s test to off-campus student-speech cases. Noting public-school
students’ near-universal access to wireless technology, Judge Fisher
worries “offensive and malicious speech [] directed at school officials
and disseminated online to the student body” will inevitably and
negatively impact the school environment.173
To conclude their opinions, Judges Smith and Fisher again look to
public policy rationales for support. On the one hand, Judge Smith
proposes that his opinion supports a robust marketplace of ideas, where
society must “tolerate thoughtless speech . . . in order to provide adequate

165. Id.
166. Id. at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“The line between ‘on-campus’ and ‘off-campus’
speech is not as clear as it once was.”).
167. Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra Subsection I.B.1.a.
173. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 951–52 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
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breathing room for valuable robust speech.”174 Judge Fisher proposes that
his opinion supports an “orderly learning environment” necessary for
children’s development.175 A robust marketplace of ideas and an orderly
learning environment are not mutually exclusive, and most would agree
that society supports both. But in the context of students’ off-campus
cyberspeech cases, these two ideas are at odds. Which idea comes out on
top in these cases will depend largely on the standards lower federal
courts use to trigger the application of Tinker’s test to off-campus
cyberspeech cases.
C. District Courts’ Adoption of Circuits’ Different Triggers
District courts faithfully adhere to the standards set by their respective
circuit courts when determining whether to apply Tinker’s substantialdisruption test in students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. Two cases out
of the District Court for the District of Minnesota, R.S. v. Minnewaska
Area School District # 2149176 and Sagehorn v. Independent School
District # 728,177 illustrate how district courts followed the Eighth
Circuit’s reasonable-foreseeability standard established in DJM v.
Hannibal Public School District # 60.178 Another case out of the District
Court for the District of Oregon, Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton School
District 53,179 illustrated how a district court applied the Ninth Circuit’s
true-threat-based standard from Wynar v. Douglas County School
District.180
What is more interesting is how district courts approach the issue of
whether to apply Tinker’s test if its circuit has not established a standard
for triggering Tinker’s test in an off-campus cyberspeech case. This
174. Id. at 941 (Smith, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 952 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
176. 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 2012).
177. 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015).
178. 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Here it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s
threats . . . would be brought to the attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial
disruption of the school environment.”); Minnewaska, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (“The law on outof-school statements by students can thus be summarized as follows: Such statements are
protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless they are
true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are so egregious as
to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption in that environment.”); Sagehorn, 122
F. Supp. 3d at 856–57 (following the Minnewaska framework).
179. 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015).
180. 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen faced with an identifiable threat of school
violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the
requirements of Tinker.”); Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (“Under Wynar, if [the student’s] offcampus comments constitute ‘an identifiable threat of school violence’ and would substantially
disrupt or materially interfere with school activities, then [the school] could discipline him without
violating the First Amendment.”).
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occurred in 2010 at the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit)181 and the District Court for
the Central District of California (9th Circuit pre-Wynar),182 in 2011 at
the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana (U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit),183 and in 2013 at the District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit).184 After thorough discussions of Tinker and its progeny as well
as other circuit and district court decisions, these district courts adopted
different standards for triggering the application of Tinker’s test to their
respective off-campus cyberspeech cases.
The district court in Evans v. Bayer185 reasoned from Second and
Third Circuit decisions that “[s]tudent off-campus speech, though
generally protected, could be subject to analysis under the Tinker
standard as well if the speech raises on-campus concerns,”186 and the
district court held that a student’s Facebook page was protected speech
because the page did not cause a substantial disruption nor was it “lewd,
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”187
The district court in J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School
District188 applied a reasonable-foreseeability standard and found that it
was reasonably foreseeable for a student’s YouTube video to make its
way on-campus, triggering and satisfying Tinker’s test.189
The district court in T.V. ex rel. R.V. v. Smith-Green Community
School Corporation190 followed the Third Circuit’s decision in Blue
Mountain assuming, without deciding, that Tinker’s test applied because
the school could not prove students’ photos posted on the internet caused,
or could reasonably be forecasted to cause, a substantial disruption.191
Finally, the district court in Nixon v. Hardin County Board of
Education192 failed to articulate a coherent standard, but it focused on
whether the social-media posts had a “connection to [the school]” (nexusbased), was “made at school” (location-based), “directed at the school”
181. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
182. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2010).
183. See T.V. ex rel. R.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind.
2011).
184. See Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
185. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
186. Id. at 1370.
187. Id. at 1374.
188. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
189. Id. at 1107–08.
190. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
191. Id. at 781, 784.
192. 988 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/5

26

Rieger: Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus

2018]

DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

721

(intent-based), or “involved the use of school time or equipment” (nexusbased).193 The Nixon court determined the student’s off-campus
cyberspeech failed to both meet these standards and cause a substantial
disruption.194
With the circuit courts divided on the standards for triggering Tinker’s
test, it is logical that district courts without binding precedent would be
divided as well. With differing standards at the circuit and district courts,
it follows that the degree of First Amendment protection afforded to a
student for her off-campus cyberspeech turns upon what standard the
federal court uses to trigger Tinker’s test. Theoretically, state courts
provide another option for parents wanting to bring civil suits against
schools for punishing their children for off-campus cyberspeech. Part II
demonstrates that this option has rarely been utilized.
II. STATE APPROACH TO OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH
This Part’s title may be misleading because the state approach to
handling students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases is virtually non-existent
and guided almost entirely by the federal approach. It is the sheer lack of
a state approach that makes this Part so critical in addressing a major
opportunity for reforming how the legal system approaches students’ offcampus cyberspeech cases. Legal scholarship has given short attention to
how state law can impact students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases.195
Section II.A discusses the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s approach in
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District196—one of the only cases, if not
the only case, before a state’s highest court concerning a student’s oncampus cyberspeech.197 Section II.B discusses how federal circuit and
district courts hint at how state constitutional provisions, statutes, and
regulations can play a larger role in students’ off-campus cyberspeech
cases.
A. State Approach Subordinate to Federal Approach
In J.S. v.
Pennsylvania
punished—in
Pennsylvania

Bethlehem Area School District, the Supreme Court of
considered whether a middle school permissibly
accordance with the U.S. Constitution, not the
Constitution—a student for creating a website titled,

193. Id. at 830, 839.
194. Id. at 839.
195. See Philip Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the
Regulation of Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 849–50.
196. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
197. As opposed to an off-campus cyberspeech case where the student does not access her
off-campus cyberspeech while at school, Bethlehem is an on-campus cyberspeech case because
the student accessed his website at school and showed it to a peer. Id. at 865.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5

722

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

“Teacher Sux,” and posting vulgar material on that website about
principals and a teacher.198 The reason the student did not allege a
violation of his right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution
is that the right to free speech is no greater under the Pennsylvania
Constitution than it is under the U.S. Constitution.199 Therefore, the court
set out to analyze this case in conformity with federal case law, namely
Tinker and its progeny at that time, Fraser and Hazelwood.200
The court determined the “constitutional analysis of a student’s
freedom of speech must include a number of considerations,” the first of
which was the location of the speech.201 The court found a “sufficient
nexus between the web site and the school” to consider the student’s offcampus cyberspeech to be on-campus because the student accessed his
website while at school and showed it to a fellow student, school faculty
and administrators accessed the website at school, the website was
“aimed . . . at the specific audience of students and others connected with
this particular School District,” and the principal and a teacher were
“subjects of the site.”202 Therefore, the court held that “where speech that
is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the
school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be
considered on-campus speech.”203
First Amendment protection of students’ on-campus cyberspeech is
outside the scope of this Note, however, Bethlehem is important for two
reasons. First, Bethlehem established that the court’s first consideration
of the constitutional analysis was the location of the cyberspeech.204 At
first blush, it appears the court may be amenable to a locationdeterminative analysis of students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases, but
buried in a footnote, the court acknowledged it would “not rule out a
holding that purely off-campus speech may nevertheless be subject to
regulation or punishment by a school district if the dictates of Tinker are

198. Id. at 850–51.
199. Id. at 853 n.5 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 (1991)); see also PA.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak . . . on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.”); Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 393 (“[T]he Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was
the ‘direct precursor’ of the freedom of speech and press.”).
200. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 860–64.
201. Id. at 864 (“First, a threshold issue regarding the ‘location’ of the speech must be
resolved to determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment are even
implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely off-campus speech?”).
202. Id. at 865.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 864.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/5

28

Rieger: Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus

2018]

DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE

723

satisfied.”205 Bethlehem fits neatly within the federal jurisprudence on
student off-campus cyberspeech cases.
The second reason Bethlehem is important is its breathtakingly broad
holding of how off-campus speech can mutate into on-campus speech. If
a student’s off-campus cyberspeech discusses her school or any of the
school’s personnel and that cyberspeech is “brought onto the school
campus” by anyone, the off-campus speech mutates into on-campus
speech.206 In other words, everything a student says about her school and
its personnel through cyberspeech is on-campus speech under this
holding, so long as it makes its way inside the schoolhouse gate. There
would be no such thing as off-campus cyberspeech that addresses specific
schools or school personnel.
Even if the court had determined the students’ cyberspeech took place
off-campus, it also found that the cyberspeech caused a substantial
disruption under Tinker’s test.207 Therefore, unless the court determined
Tinker’s test did not apply to students’ off-campus cyberspeech, then the
court would reach the same conclusion: The school permissibly punished
the student for his website and its content. Therefore, Bethlehem likely
does not instill confidence in Pennsylvania’s parents and students
contemplating bringing off-campus cyberspeech cases before
Pennsylvania’s state courts.
As discussed in Subsection I.B.1, not a single federal circuit court has
utilized location-determinative analysis in determining whether Tinker’s
test is applicable to students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. Yet, there is
hope for students and their parents when looking closely at how lower
federal courts addressed the applicability of state constitutions, statutes,
and regulations in these cases.
B. Federal Court Cases Addressing Applicability of State Law
Some of the lower federal court decisions, discussed earlier, address
how state constitutions, statutes, and regulations may provide an effective
means for students and their parents to bring claims that students’ offcampus cyberspeech should be provided greater protection than the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment provides pursuant to lower federal
courts’ interpretations of Tinker and its progeny cases. The only issue is
that not all states provide constitutions, statutes, or regulations offering
these protections. Doninger v. Niehoff, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain School District, and R.L. v. Central York School District208
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 864 n.11.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 869.
183 F. Supp. 3d 625 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
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each provide an example of how the states could offer new avenues for
future litigation.
At the district court level in Doninger, the student claimed her school
violated her right to free speech under the Connecticut Constitution.209
The district court dismissed without prejudice the student’s state
constitutional claim by refusing to grant supplemental jurisdiction,210 and
the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.211 The district court offered a
variety of reasons for its dismissal—the brief spent less than two pages
on the claim; the brief did not identify any Connecticut case deciding the
Connecticut Constitution affords greater free-speech protections for
public-school students than does the U.S. Constitution; the Connecticut
Constitution may not afford money damages for a violation of one’s free
speech right; deciding whether a state constitution grants greater
protections than the U.S. Constitution is not the role of federal courts.212
Offering a glimmer of hope, the district court noted, “Ms. Doninger is, of
course, free to pursue her [state constitutional] claims in state court.”213
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third
Circuit held that the school’s suspension of the student for creating a fake
MySpace profile of the principal violated his First Amendment right to
free speech because the school did not satisfy Tinker’s test.214 Less
obvious was the court’s holding in a footnote that the school’s
punishment violated a Pennsylvania statute—24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-510—
limiting school districts to
adopt[ing] and enforce[ing] such reasonable rules and
regulations . . . regarding the conduct and deportment of all
pupils attending the public schools in the district, during
such time as they are under the supervision of the board of
school directors and teachers, including the time necessarily
spent in coming to and returning from school.215
The Third Circuit looked to how a state case interpreted the statute and
concluded that it prohibited the school district from “punishing students
for conduct occurring outside of school hours—even if such conduct
occurs on school property.”216 Therefore, the Third Circuit reasoned that
209. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 228 (D. Conn. 2009); see CONN. CONST. art.
I, § 4 (“Every citizen may freely speak . . . his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty.”).
210. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
211. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 357 (2d Cir. 2011).
212. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 228–29.
213. Id. at 229.
214. 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011).
215. Id. at 929 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5–510).
216. Id.
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student conduct occurring during non-school hours and off campus would
also be protected.217
In his dissent to Blue Mountain, Judge Fisher distinguished the facts
of the state case interpreting the statute from the facts of Blue Mountain,
finding that the state case involved student’s conduct at school during
non-school hours that “had no effect on the school,” whereas Blue
Mountain involved student conduct that “had a foreseeable impact on the
operations of the classroom.”218 Therefore, Judge Fisher would hold that
the statute is not as exhaustive as the majority holds and the statute does
not prohibit regulations of “out-of-school conduct that threatens to
materially interfere with the educational process.”219 Nevertheless, Blue
Mountain provides an example where a state statute is interpreted to
protect a student’s off-campus cyberspeech.
In the federal district court case of R.L. v. Central York School
District, a student claimed that the school violated his free speech rights
under a Pennsylvania’s Administrative Code, 22 Pa. Code § 12.9(b),
which states “[s]tudents shall have the right to express themselves unless
the expression materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process, threatens serious harm to the school or community, encourages
unlawful activity or interferes with another individual’s rights.”220
Finding that the language substantially similar to Tinker’s test, the district
court held that if the drafters intended to expand students’ speech rights
beyond those protected in Tinker, then the drafters would have done so
explicitly.221 Although this is an example where a state regulatory code
failed to protect a student’s off-campus cyberspeech, the analysis
implicitly recognizes the possibility that a regulatory code could be
drafted and implemented to shield students from school punishment for
their off-campus cyberspeech.
What is garnered from these three federal cases is the possibility that
states can enact laws providing their students stronger free speech
protections for off-campus cyberspeech than the lower federal courts
currently provide. These cases also offer two important notes for
litigation strategy. First, to argue that a student receives greater free
speech protections under a state constitution than under the U.S.
Constitution, an off-campus cyberspeech case should only be brought in
federal court if there is case law supporting such an argument. Otherwise,
the argument should be brought before a state court. Second, to argue that
a student receives greater free speech protections under a state statute or
regulation than that under federal law, an off-campus cyberspeech case
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 949–50 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 950, 950 n.7.
183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 641 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting 22 PA. CODE § 12.9(b)).
Id. at 642.
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can be brought in federal or state court, but the outcome will likely turn
upon the breadth of the statute, including whether the statute or
regulation’s language tracks or explicitly departs from the language of
Tinker’s test.
III. PROTECTING THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT
Courts and school administrations have legitimate concerns for the
protection of the school environment from the negative effects associated
with students’ off-campus cyberspeech. These concerns primarily
involve the protection of students’ and faculty members’ well-being and
reputations, as well as the promotion of an orderly learning environment.
In his dissent to Blue Mountain, Judge Fisher summarized the concern
that narrowly applying Tinker’s test—or worse, scrapping or limiting the
application of Tinker’s test—to off-campus cyberspeech cases “leaves
schools defenseless to protect teachers and school officials against
[students’] attacks and powerless to discipline students for the
consequences of their actions.”222 This Part challenges this contention on
two fronts. Section III.A challenges whether scrapping, limiting, or
narrowing the application of Tinker’s test will leave school
administrations defenseless. Section III.B challenges whether school
administrative punishment provides the best protection for the school
environment, as well as society at large.
A. Alternatives to School Administrative Punishment
Lower federal courts’ decisions in students’ off-campus cyberspeech
cases show school administrations are most concerned about three types
of off-campus cyberspeech: (1) threatening; (2) bullying or harassing;
and (3) defamatory. Most students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases fall
into one or more of these categories. To date, lower federal courts have
utilized the application of Tinker’s test to either uphold or enjoin school
administrations’ punishments of students for these types of off-campus
cyberspeech. However, Judge Fisher’s concern that scrapping, limiting,
or narrowing the application of Tinker’s test would leave school
administrations defenseless against these types of off-campus
cyberspeech does not appear well-founded. There are alternative
governmental and private causes of action that can provide redress for
these types of off-campus cyberspeech.
1. True Threats
School administrations are never defenseless when punishing a
student for her off-campus speech when that speech constitutes a true
threat, defined as a: “serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
222. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
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unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”223 The Supreme
Court has concluded that true threats do not receive First Amendment
protection from state punishment.224 Thus, the application of Tinker’s test
does not appear necessary for a court to uphold a school administration’s
punishment of a student for her off-campus cyberspeech if it constitutes
a true threat.
Several federal circuit courts have addressed off-campus cyberspeech
cases in which the cyberspeech either could have been deemed a true
threat or was found to be a true threat. The Second and Fifth Circuits
applied Tinker’s test and chose not to engage in true-threat analysis
because the off-campus cyberspeech at issue satisfied Tinker’s test.225
The Ninth Circuit fashioned a true-threat-based standard for triggering
Tinker’s test because that “approach . . . strikes the appropriate balance
between allowing schools to act to protect their students from credible
threats of violence while recognizing and protecting freedom of
expression by students.”226 Finally, the Eighth Circuit both engaged in
true-threat analysis and applied Tinker’s test, finding the off-campus
cyberspeech at issue not protected under either approach.227 Despite this
variation, these circuit court opinions support the contention that school
administrations may punish students for off-campus cyberspeech that
constitutes a true threat without any concern of abridging a student’s First
Amendment right to free speech. Various legal scholars have either
agreed with or advocated for the position that Tinker’s test is not
necessary to uphold school administrative punishment in the true-threat
context.228
2. Cyberbullying and Online Harassment
Many legal scholars have recently addressed, and offered solutions
on, the issue of how the legal system should address students’ off-campus
cyberspeech that constitutes cyberbullying or online harassment. At one
223. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (citation omitted).
224. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
225. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 400 (5th Cir. 2015); Wisniewski v.
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).
226. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen
faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in
response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”).
227. DJM v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 764, 766 (8th Cir. 2011).
228. See Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt
Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process,
and Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 661–62 (2011); Shaver, supra
note 35, at 1581–88; Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of
Cyberharassment, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 430, 430 nn.6–7 (2017).
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end, some scholars support triggering Tinker’s test through the
reasonable-foreseeability standard and nexus-based standard.229 At the
other end, one scholar rejects the application of Tinker’s test but
advocates for non-punitive, anti-bullying programs.230 In the middle, one
scholar even proposes the application of Tinker’s second, less-discussed
“rights of others” prong.231
Due to the many terrible stories of children and young adults
victimized by the horrors of cyberbullying and online harassment, states
have enacted several laws related to the subject. All fifty states have some
form of bullying or harassment law, or both: forty-nine states’ laws
require a school policy on cyberbullying; forty-eight states’ laws
explicitly include cyberbullying or online harassment, or both; forty-five
states’ laws permit school sanctions for cyberbullying; but only sixteen
states permit school sanctions for off-campus cyberbullying or online
harassment.232 Some legal scholars advocate that more states should enact
cyberbullying and online harassment laws permitting school sanctions for
off-campus cyberbullying or online harassment.233 Even if states do not
enact such laws, many exist in application. For example, in Kowalski v.
Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit triggered Tinker’s test and
upheld the school administration’s punishment of a student for her
bullying and harassing off-campus cyberspeech, even though West
Virginia’s anti-bullying law did not provide for school sanctions for offcampus cyberbullying or online harassment.234
If lower federal courts are going to follow the Kowalski approach, then
states’ cyberbullying and online harassment laws will not be successful
in limiting school administrative punishment to students’ on-campus
cyberspeech constituting cyberbullying or online harassment. It is
possible school administrations could seek to honor legislative intent and
refer cases of cyberbullying and online harassment to other governmental
authorities, such as the police, or parents of those involved. Forty-four
states enacted laws permitting criminal sanctions for cyberbullying or
online harassment,235 but some legal scholars have criticized these

229. Goodno, supra note 228, at 696–97 (offering model statute); Lee, supra note 195, at
884 (supporting reasonable-foreseeability or nexus-based standard); Waldman, supra note 228, at
450–52 (arguing for “relational nexus” standard).
230. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1098–1101.
231. Shaver, supra note 35, at 1589.
232. Bullying Laws Across America, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2017),
https://cyberbullying.org/bullying-laws.
233. Goodno, supra note 228, at 696–98; Lee, supra note 195, at 884.
234. Lee, supra note 195, at 884.
235. CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR., supra note 232.
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statutes as poorly drafted, overbroad, and potentially in violation of the
First Amendment.236
3. Defamation
An action for defamation is an option for students and faculty
members who are maligned by students’ off-campus cyberspeech,
whether it be parody profiles or negative reviews. Off-campus
cyberspeech cases involving parody profiles and negative reviews, which
are the cases best suited for a defamation action, are also the cases in
which most students prevailed because the cyberspeech failed to satisfy
the Tinker-test requirement that there be a substantial disruption, or the
reasonable foreseeability of a substantial disruption.237
However, there are many reasons why faculty or students may prefer
school administrative punishment to a defamation action. First, it is not
clear whether an action for defamation can offer faculty and students any
better odds in cases involving parody pages, negative reviews, or similar
off-campus cyberspeech. Legal scholars have also recognized that
defamation actions fail to offer remedies that “acknowledge the unique
nature of the digital world.”238 Finally, parents and faculty members
pursuing the defamation action could bear the high costs of civil litigation
under certain fee arrangements.
B. School Administrative Punishment and School-to-Prison Pipeline
The school administrative punishment at issue in students’ offcampus cyberspeech cases often consists of suspensions and
expulsions. Both of these forms of punishment are “[e]xclusionary
discipline . . . [that] is commonly understood to be a ‘drastic’ remedy,
one with enormous downsides that can change the trajectory of a child’s
life forever.”239 A 2014 report by the Council of State Governments found
that suspended students are “at a significantly higher risk of falling
behind academically, dropping out of school, and coming into contact
with the juvenile justice system.” 240 The same report also explained that
these “risks exist whether a student misses classes during in-school

236. See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying,
77 MO. L. REV. 693, 698 (2012).
237. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).
238. Lee, supra note 195, at 862.
239. Catherine J. Ross, “Bitch,” Go Directly to Jail: Student Speech and Entry into the
School-to-Prison Pipeline, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 717, 718 (2016).
240. Id. at 721.
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suspension, during an out-of-school suspension that lasts only a few days,
or is excluded for weeks or months.”241
Proponents of applying Tinker’s test in off-campus cyberspeech cases
dealing with cyberbullying or online harassment have put forth the
argument that schools are in the best position to remedy these situations,
in part because a suspension or expulsion does not derail a child or young
adult’s life to the same degree as a criminal conviction for the same
offense.242 However, legal scholars examining the school-to-prison
pipeline would caution that school administrative punishment consisting
of exclusionary discipline may not be as effective a remedy as previously
thought.243
IV. DIGITIZING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
During the Internet era, technology has enabled students to produce
various forms of cyberspeech accessible by anyone anywhere at any time.
As a result, anyone with access to a student’s texts, e-mails, instant
messages, posts, blogs, and other forms of cyberspeech can reproduce
that student’s cyberspeech in a matter of seconds at any location with WiFi or cellular service. According to Pew’s most recent research study of
teens’ social media and technology use, of teens ages thirteen to
seventeen, 92% go online every day, nearly 75% have access to a
smartphone, and 71% join more than one social networking site.244 The
increasing rates of wireless-technology ownership and use make offcampus cyberspeech only that much easier to access and bring inside the
schoolhouse gate. Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly all offcampus cyberspeech can make its way inside the schoolhouse gate and to
a school administrator’s desk.
By using reasonable-foreseeability or nexus-based standards to trigger
the application of Tinker’s test to students’ off-campus cyberspeech
cases, lower federal courts are connecting a fiber-optic cable from the
schoolhouse gate to a student’s electronic devices, mutating all offcampus cyberspeech into on-campus cyberspeech. As a result of this
trend, legal scholars—like Professors Papandrea, Lee Goldman, and Clay
Calvert—have argued Tinker’s test should either no longer be applied to

241. Id. at 719.
242. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 195, at 863–68.
243. See Thalia González, Keeping Kids in Schools: Restorative Justice, Punitive Discipline,
and the School to Prison Pipeline, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 287–98 (2012).
244. PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 2015:
SMARTPHONES FACILITATE SHIFTS IN COMMUNICATION LANDSCAPE FOR TEENS 2–3 (2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/04/PI_TeensandTech_Update2015_0409151.pdf.
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off-campus cyberspeech cases245 or be revised to better protect students’
right to free speech.246
This Part contends that the schoolhouse gate should be digitized to
adequately protect students’ First Amendment right to free speech in the
Internet era. Section IV.A agrees with and builds upon those legal
scholars’ contention that Tinker’s test should be scrapped or at least
narrowed, arguing that students’ cyberspeech, despite its “everywhere at
once” nature, should be treated like other forms of student speech that
receive greater free speech protections off-campus than they do oncampus. Section IV.A’s new federal approach is designed to aid federal
courts in this pursuit to unwire Tinker’s test for the wireless world.
Section IV.B’s new state approach is designed to help states switch
the safety on Tinker’s triggers by prohibiting school administrations from
punishing students for their off-campus cyberspeech, except when that
cyberspeech is either a true threat or unlawful (for example,
cyberbullying, harassment, and defamation). This new state approach can
adequately protect the school environment while providing students
stronger free speech protections for their off-campus cyberspeech.
A. Unwiring Tinker for the Wireless World: A New Federal Approach
Erwin Chemerinsky once described Tinker as the “most important
Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights of
students.”247 Tinker originally stood for the proposition that students do
not shed their constitutional rights when entering the schoolhouse gate.248
Today, Tinker stands for the proposition that school administrations do
not surrender their power to punish students after students exit the
schoolhouse gate.
The standards federal courts use to trigger Tinker’s test can determine
whether students’ off-campus cyberspeech will be protected under the
First Amendment.249 Further, Papandrea warns that once Tinker’s test is
triggered “many courts are far too deferential to schools’ assertions that
the challenged [student-speech] was substantially and materially
245. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1102 (“The application of Tinker’s materially disruptive
standard—regardless of whether it is preceded with an inquiry into whether the speech is properly
labeled ‘on-campus’ or ‘off-campus’ speech—provides little protection to students’ expressive
rights. . . . [T]he Tinker test is ill-suited to speech in the digital media.”).
246. Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 285 (2001); Lee Goldman,
Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 430
(2011).
247. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 (2000).
248. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
249. See supra Sections I.B–I.C.
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disruptive to schoolwork or discipline.”250 This Note argues that under a
new federal approach, federal courts should either do one of two things.
First, federal courts can scrap Tinker’s test and apply full First
Amendment free speech protections to off-campus cyberspeech cases.
Second, federal courts can employ a more stringent standard for
triggering Tinker’s test.
Before discussing how to scrap or limit Tinker’s test, it is important to
reiterate that several legal scholars believe Tinker’s test is beneficial in
application to all or some of students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases. As
discussed in Subsection III.A.2, some legal scholars, including Naomi
Goodno, Philip Lee, and Ari Waldman, also argue that Tinker’s test
serves a unique purpose in addressing cyberbullying and online
harassment.251
In a study of federal district court cyberspeech cases, Professor Tova
Wolking concluded that district courts “used [Tinker’s] balancing test to
uphold students’ off-campus cyber expression unless it is outweighed by
the countervailing rights of teachers or other students.”252 Wolking
favorably viewed how district courts approached and analyzed students’
off-campus cyberspeech cases,253 and she created a three-part
“Framework for Electronic (‘Cyber’) Speech Created Off School
Grounds & Without School Resources.”254 Wolking’s framework
incorporates a nebulous nexus standard—that the “student brought [the
cyberspeech] to school or [the cyberspeech] was accessed at school”—
for triggering Tinker’s test.255 Wolking’s nexus standard appears fairly
easy to meet because the off-campus cyberspeech need only be accessed
on-campus by anyone to satisfy the nexus requirement. If a student brings
the cyberspeech to school, satisfying the other prong of Wolking’s nexus
standard, it is arguable that federal courts would consider that on-campus
cyberspeech.256
For those who seek to scrap, limit, or narrow the application of
Tinker’s test to off-campus cyberspeech cases, one of the simpler
approaches would be to treat off-campus cyberspeech like other forms of
250. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1102.
251. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
252. Tova Wolking, School Administrators as Cyber Censors: Cyber Speech and First
Amendment Rights, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1507, 1528 (2008) (“For example, school discipline
will be upheld if a student’s off-campus cyber speech poses a ‘true threat’ to a teacher’s safety or
incites on-campus disruption, but the student’s free speech rights will be upheld if he merely posts
unflattering comments about his teacher or uses vulgar language on the Internet.”).
253. Id. at 1527–28 (“[L]ower courts have clung to Tinker; and more often than not, they
rely on Tinker to uphold student rights.”).
254. Id. at 1524.
255. Id.
256. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
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off-campus student speech. Goldman is a supporter of this approach and
argues that “student speech occur[ing] outside of school
supervision . . . should receive the same First Amendment protection as
non-student’s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not
implicate the ‘essential characteristics’ of the school environment that
justify special First Amendment treatment of student speech.”257 Such a
principle has been recognized by federal circuit courts in off-campus
student-speech cases involving underground newspapers,258 and even a
case involving a student flipping the bird to a teacher in a restaurant
parking lot.259 However, proponents of Tinker’s test, and even opponents
of Tinker’s test, in the off-campus cyberspeech context have already
acknowledged that off-campus cyberspeech is unique because of its
everywhere-at-once nature.260
Calvert took another approach, proposing a narrower standard than
that of Wolking for when schools may punish students for an off-campuscreated website:
[O]nly when a student “brings” his or her home-created Web
site onto campus, either by downloading it on a schoolcontrolled computer or by encouraging other students to do
so, that a school should be able to assert discipline authority.
And it is only in this situation that the Tinker substantialand-material disruption standard would apply. . . . If the
speech remains outside the proverbial schoolhouse gate, then
administrators should not view juvenile Web site creators as
students but, rather, as citizens who face the same legal
repercussions in the civil and criminal justice systems as
adults. School discipline becomes unnecessary in this
situation.261
Calvert’s standard can be extended to all forms of cyberspeech, not
just websites. Calvert’s standard would only trigger Tinker’s substantialdisruption analysis if the student either accesses the cyberspeech at school
or encourages others to access the cyberspeech at school. Thus, it appears
Calvert supports a standard that would only be triggered in a situation
analogous to J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, in which the court

257. Goldman, supra note 246, at 430.
258. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050–52 (2d Cir. 1979); Shanley v. Ne. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974–75 (5th Cir. 1972).
259. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1440–42 (D. Me. 1986).
260. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (Smith, J.,
concurring).
261. Calvert, supra note 246, at 285.
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held a student accessing a website at school mutates off-campus
cyberspeech into on-campus cyberspeech.262
Papandrea takes the extreme position arguing that Tinker’s
substantial-disruption test be scrapped and First Amendment principles
be applied to all cyberspeech cases whether on- or off-campus.263
Papandrea argues that schools are punishing students for “[s]peech that
in another time would escape the school’s notice.”264 As technological
devices become more intertwined with the lives of millennials, Papandrea
fears how that technology may serve as “the basis for suspensions,
expulsions, and other significant punishment.”265 Ultimately, Papandrea
finds that Tinker now provides little in terms of First Amendment
protections for students as federal courts employ reasonableforeseeability standards in triggering Tinker’s substantial-disruption test
and gives deference to school officials in forecasting of substantial
disruptions in the off-campus cyberspeech context.266
Adopting Calvert’s narrow standard or heeding Papandrea’s call to
scrap Tinker would certainly expand students’ free speech rights in the
context of off-campus cyberspeech cases. But it seems unlikely that lower
federal courts would do either when the courts’ analyses always account
for the special characteristics of the school environment267 and the
“‘everywhere at once’ nature of the internet.”268 A more moderate
approach that may appeal to lower federal courts is treating off-campus
cyberspeech like other forms of off-campus student speech. Another
option would be for lower federal courts to adopt the standard applied by
the Fifth Circuit en banc in Bell: “Tinker governs our analysis . . . when
a student intentionally directs at the school community speech reasonably
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimate a teacher,
even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus
without the use of school resources.”269
By including an intent element in this standard, district courts within
the Fifth Circuit taking a more narrow view of this standard can look at
the facts to determine whether the student intended to direct off-campus
cyberspeech at the school community.270 The Fifth Circuit en banc also
required that the cyberspeech be reasonably understood as threatening,
262. 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
263. Papandrea, supra note 98, at 1102.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 942 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith,
J., concurring).
268. Id. at 940.
269. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015).
270. Id.
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harassing, or intimidating to a teacher or conceivably anyone related to
the school environment such as principals, fellow students, and other
school employees.271 Although the Fifth Circuit en banc broadly applied
its standard to the facts in Bell,272 such a standard could be a first step
toward adopting narrower standards and scrapping Tinker’s substantialdisruption test altogether, ushering in a new federal approach to offcampus cyberspeech cases.
B. Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger: A New State Approach
With the Supreme Court remaining silent on off-campus cyberspeech
cases,273 and the circuit courts adopting different standards triggering
Tinker’s test,274 it is time for the states to supersede Tinker by enacting a
law that adequately protects students’ First Amendment right to free
speech in the Internet-era.
This Note proposes the following statutory framework:
School officials shall not punish a student for his or her offcampus cyberspeech, unless
(1) school officials reasonably believe the student’s offcampus cyberspeech constitutes a true threat to any
member of the school community; or
(2) the student’s off-campus cyberspeech is declared or
adjudicated by a court to be violative of federal or state
law; or
(3) the student who produced the off-campus cyberspeech
(a) intentionally brings that off-campus cyberspeech to
school or intentionally causes another to bring that offcampus cyberspeech to school; and
(b) that off-campus cyberspeech causes a substantial
disruption at school.
Two issues that jurisdictions will need to resolve is how to define the
terms off-campus and cyberspeech. With technological evolution, it is
likely any definitions created will need to be amended. Beyond those
issues, this statutory language is designed to accomplish three critical
ends.
First, this statutory framework explicitly creates a sphere of protection
for students’ off-campus cyberspeech.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text.
See supra Subsection I.A.3.
See supra Section I.B.
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Second, it recognizes exceptions to address courts’ and school
administrations’ primary concerns. This statutory framework would not
protect off-campus cyberspeech that would constitute a true threat. It
would not protect off-campus cyberspeech declared or adjudicated by a
court to be unlawful, such as cyberbullying or online harassment in the
states that have enacted anti-cyberbullying statutes, as well as
defamation.275 It also would not protect a student’s off-campus
cyberspeech that is designed to disrupt the orderly learning environment
in the event the student intentionally mutates off-campus speech into oncampus speech either through her own actions or through the actions of
another.
Third, this statutory framework provides an avenue for students and
their parents to bring a substantive claim in state courts or federal courts
other than a violation of the child’s First Amendment right to free speech
or a corresponding provision in a state constitution.
Federal courts have provided a roadmap for legislators to draft statutes
that can better protect students’ right to free speech than the First
Amendment in the off-campus cyberspeech context.276 In Blue Mountain
and Central York, the Third Circuit and the District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania respectively reasoned how a school violated a
Pennsylvania statute that broadly protected a student’s right to free
speech, and how a school did not violate a Pennsylvania regulatory code
because it tracked Tinker’s language, thus granting no more free speech
protection to the student than Tinker’s test.277 The proposed statutory
language is broad in that it grants free speech protection to all students’
off-campus cyberspeech, except under three narrow circumstances. The
proposed statute can also be broadened to protect all student off-campus
speech. In addition, this proposed language expressly departs from
Tinker’s language and lower federal courts’ interpretation of Tinker’s
language.
By enacting a similar statutory framework or language that provides
greater free speech protections for off-campus cyberspeech, state
legislatures will again perform their noble service as laboratories of
democracy by protecting students’ right to free speech beyond that which
is currently granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
CONCLUSION
With the Supreme Court silent on whether Tinker’s substantialdisruption test is applicable to students’ off-campus cyberspeech, circuit
courts creatively fashioned different standards to trigger Tinker’s test.
275. For thorough discussion about cyberbullying statutes and First Amendment issues
associated with those statutes, see Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 236, at 693.
276. See supra Section II.B.
277. See supra Section II.B.
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District courts adhere to circuit courts’ binding precedent, but if a circuit
had not decided what standard to apply, the district courts in those circuits
applied the standard or standards the district courts found most
persuasive. State courts, on the other hand, play virtually no role in
students’ off-campus cyberspeech cases, but federal courts have hinted at
ways state law can provide new avenues to protect students’ right to free
speech.
This Note has proposed new federal and state approaches for offcampus cyberspeech cases. Federal courts could apply more stringent
standards to trigger Tinker’s test or scrap Tinker’s test altogether in the
off-campus cyberspeech context. But if the federal courts continue on
their current course, state legislatures can enact statutes or regulations
that supersede Tinker by providing parents the opportunity to file civil
actions in state court. This Note’s proposed statutory framework can
provide for a state action addressing violations of a student’s right to free
speech if and when school administrations punish a student for her offcampus cyberspeech, unless that cyberspeech was threatening, unlawful,
or mutated into on-campus speech.
With students’ increasing usage of cyberspeech both on- and offcampus, students should be just as worried that their constitutional right
to free speech will be shed when they exit the schoolhouse gate as when
they enter it. This Note proposes new federal and state approaches
designed to digitize the schoolhouse gate for the twenty-first century and
protect students’ free speech as Tinker intended nearly a half-century ago.
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